By: Christopher Kozak
Battlefield realities rather
than great power politics will determine the ultimate terms of a settlement to
end the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in
Russia and Iran have internalized this basic principle even as Washington and
other Western capitals pinned their hopes upon UN-sponsored
Geneva Talks, which faltered only two
days after they began on February 1,
2016. Russian airpower and Iranian manpower have brought President Assad within
five miles of completing the encirclement of Aleppo City, the largest urban
center in Syria and an opposition stronghold since 2012. The current campaign
has already surpassed the high-water mark set by the regime’s previous failed
attempt to besiege Aleppo City in early 2015. The full encirclement of Aleppo
City would fuel a humanitarian catastrophe, shatter opposition morale, fundamentally
challenge Turkish strategic ambitions, and deny the opposition its most
valuable bargaining chip before the international community.
The campaign against Aleppo City
began in October 2015 and proceeded in several phases. Regime forces enabled by
Russia and Iran initially mounted probing attacks along multiple fronts in Aleppo and Idlib
Provinces as part of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend the
opposition. They conducted shaping operations in the southern, eastern, and northern countryside of Aleppo City in order to draw opposition forces out of urban terrain, relieve
long-besieged pockets of regime forces, and set conditions for a future
decisive operation to besiege
the city, as ISW warned on December 30, 2015. They also secured core regime
terrain along the Syrian Coast against further opposition attacks through a
series of rapid offensives in Latakia Province. These gains marked a
fundamental shift in battlefield momentum following dramatic losses experienced
by the regime in the first half of 2015.
President Assad has used unconventional
shaping operations to complement these ground offensives and further strengthen
his bargaining position. The regime intensified its campaign of sieges and
aerial bombardment against opposition-held pockets in Homs and Damascus
Provinces in order to impose one-sided local ceasefires that would allow it to consolidate control in these two vital cities. These
operations in some cases included the use of chlorine gas and other
unidentified chemical weapons in violation of international prohibitions. The
regime also escalated a campaign of targeted assassinations against key
opposition commanders - most notably the Saudi-backed Damascus powerbroker
Zahran Alloush - in order to weaken the political influence of its opponents.
These gains strengthen the hand held by President Assad at the negotiating
table and incentivize further violence among all sides in an attempt to secure
additional concessions during an eventual settlement. The mounting pressure
will tend to drive the opposition towards militarily reliable but politically irreconcilable
Salafi-jihadist groups such as Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Conditions
on the ground remain unsuitable for the achievement of any meaningful peace in
Syria.
Aleppo Province
The regime and its allies have waged
a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to set
conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City. The
opposition is uniquely
vulnerable in Aleppo City due to its position along a lengthy salient that
relies upon one primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that faces
compounding pressures from the regime, ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The
return of the largest urban center in Syria to government control would
represent a major victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that would
bolster his leverage in current or future political negotiations. A successful
campaign for Aleppo City would also constitute a serious blow to the morale of
opposition groups that have contested the city since mid-2012.
The operations in Aleppo Province
have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian
proxy fighters. Russia concentrated a significant portion of its air campaign
against opposition forward positions and supply lines in Aleppo Province.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials estimated in October 2015 that up
to 2,000 Hezbollah, Afghan, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem
Suleimani currently operated in Aleppo Province. U.S. officials also stated
that Russian
Spetsnaz special operations forces recently began operating in conjunction
with pro-regime forces near Aleppo City. The regime has become increasingly
dependent on this foreign support in order to conduct successful maneuver
warfare.
Southern
Aleppo Province
The regime and its allies launched
the first shaping operations of their reinvigorated campaign in Aleppo Province
on October 15, 2015. Regime forces supported by heavy Russian air cover and
Iraqi Shi’a militiamen mounted
an offensive against the sparsely-populated opposition-held villages in the
southern countryside of Aleppo City. The regime secured steady advances against
opposition forces over subsequent weeks despite opposition attempts to
reinforce the front with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and northern
Aleppo Province. Several Western-backed opposition factions also deployed
multiple TOW anti-tank missiles systems to the region. An opportunistic
attack by ISIS in late October 2015 managed to disrupt the ongoing
operation temporarily by seizing several positions along the regime’s primary
ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces
nonetheless seized the opposition-held towns of Hadher and Al-Eis on November
12, securing the only prominent population centers in southern Aleppo Province.
The opposition responded to the
advances by deploying valuable reinforcements to the region. Syrian al-Qaeda
affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other key opposition groups reinforced the
southern countryside of Aleppo City from Idlib Province. Prominent
Salafi-jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) issued a general call for
mobilization to southern Aleppo Province on November 13, 2015. The arrival of
fresh opposition reinforcements managed to blunt and in some cases reverse regime
gains on a tactical level. These minor reversals also corresponded with an
apparent operational pause by pro-regime forces to consolidate their new
holdings and receive additional reinforcement, including several advanced T-90
main battle tanks provided by Russia. The regime mounted a renewed offensive in
early December and seized the opposition-held town of Khan Touman directly
southwest of Aleppo City by December 20. The regime and its allies have used
these new gains to contest the strategic M5 Highway and the opposition-held
southwestern suburbs of Aleppo City.
The regime designed its operational
maneuvers in southern Aleppo Province to set conditions for the upcoming
offensive to isolate opposition forces in Aleppo City. The offensive drew
opposition reinforcements out of Aleppo City and fixed them in a battle of open
terrain that allowed the regime to fully-utilize its advantages in armor,
airpower, and artillery. The loss of this pool of combat reserves will weaken
opposition defenses against future operations by the regime and its allies to
isolate Aleppo City. The gains also position the regime to threaten the eastern
flank of core opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province. Iranian-backed proxies
have repeatedly asserted that the operation in southern Aleppo Province
ultimately aims to relieve the besieged pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya
near Idlib City. The need to defend against this threat further constrains the
flexibility and freedom of action available to opposition commanders in
northwestern Syria.
Kuweires Airbase and
Al-Bab
The regime and its allies began a
second simultaneous shaping operation in eastern Aleppo Province on October 15,
2015 in order to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. The base faced repeated
challenges from ISIS that threatened to overrun the facility, fueling simmering
discontent within the regime’s base of popular support along the Syrian Coast.
Elite regime light infantry units supported by Russian aircraft and reinforcements
from Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a slow battle of penetration along a narrow
front in the face of heavy ISIS resistance. Pro-regime forces successfully established
a ground line of communications (GLOC) to the Kuweires Airbase on November
10 in a major symbolic victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The
operation revitalized the morale of regime loyalists and demonstrated the first
tangible battlefield achievement for the regime since the Russian intervention
on September 30.
The regime has since leveraged its
forward position at the Kuweires Airbase as a staging ground to conduct
follow-on operations against ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province. Pro-regime forces
expanded the defensive perimeter of the Kuweires Airbase throughout late
November 2015, enabling the regime to resume
both fixed-wing and rotary-wing flights out of the airbase by December 15. Regime
forces later conducted several advances west of Kuweires Airbase in an
offensive aimed at encircling an ISIS pocket that threaten the key regime-held
logistical hub of Al-Safira and the adjacent supply route to Aleppo City. This
offensive sets the stage for a classic ‘cauldron battle’ drawn from Soviet
military doctrine, illustrating the degree to which Russian advisors likely
play a role in operational planning. The regime also advanced north from the
Kuweires Airbase in January 2016, seizing several villages less than five miles
from the major ISIS-held urban center of Al-Bab. Regime forces currently hold
optimal positions to mount a potential operation to seize Al-Bab and secure
additional legitimacy before the international community as a partner against
ISIS. Russia reportedly deployed
two hundred personnel and several air defense systems to Kuweires Airbase in
February 2016 in likely preparation for such an operation. The regime may
intend to use future anti-ISIS operations by the U.S.-led coalition in eastern
Aleppo Province as an opportunity to secure its own gains near Aleppo City.
Northern Aleppo
Province
The regime mounted its most
significant shaping operation in Aleppo Province in February 2016 with a
renewed attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces lifted the siege
of the pro-regime towns of Nubl and Zahraa in northern Aleppo Province on
February 3, linking regime forces in an arc of control that dominates almost
all opposition supply lines between Turkey and Aleppo City. The regime
previously failed to capitalize upon a similar offensive over the same terrain
in February 2015. The opposition nonetheless faces a severe challenge in
mobilizing sufficient forces to reverse this new attack given the conditions
set by the regime and its allies in Aleppo Province over the past four months.
The regime and its allies will likely attempt to complete the encirclement of
Aleppo City in coming weeks by seizing its opposition-held northwestern
suburbs. The end result of this operation could be a protracted siege of Aleppo
City that bolsters the political leverage exerted by Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad while subjecting the remaining civilian population in opposition-held
districts to a punishing campaign of starvation and aerial bombardment.
Latakia Province
The regime and its allies
simultaneously conducted major operations to expel opposition forces from core
regime terrain along the Syrian Coast. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusra (JN) and other armed factions have occupied the Jabal al-Turkman and
Jabal al-Akrad regions of northern Latakia Province since 2012, providing the
opposition with a safe haven from which to threaten the Alawite population that
constitute the popular base of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
This threat reached unprecedented heights after opposition forces secured
control over almost all of Idlib Province in mid-2015 and began posturing
for an offensive into Latakia Province. The stabilization of this front
thus constituted an immediate priority for the regime and its foreign backers.
Russia provided extensive military support with the provision of technical
advisors, armored vehicles, rocket artillery, and a heavy campaign of aerial
bombardment based from its nearby airfield at Bassel al-Assad International
Airport near Latakia City. Iran also committed significant numbers of proxy
forces to enable the mobilization of local pro-regime militias. These
deployments produced a significant reversal in the balance of forces in Latakia
Province over recent the past three months.
Pro-regime forces launched an
offensive against opposition forces in Jabal al-Turkman on November 19, 2015 in
an attempt to deny opposition forces access to supply routes across the Turkish
border. The regime seized multiple villages and hilltops in the mountainous
region within several days with the support of heavy Russian airstrikes. The
offensive drew immediate condemnation from Turkey as thousands of ethnic
Turkmen refugees fled across the border ahead of regime forces. Two Turkish
fighter jets later shot
down a Russian warplane on November 24 after the aircraft violated the
border while conducting operations against the opposition. The escalation in
geopolitical tensions nonetheless failed to prevent continued tactical advances
by the regime and its allies in both Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad.
The regime secured major
breakthroughs in its operations to clear Latakia Province in January 2016.
Regime forces seized
the opposition stronghold of Salma in Jabal al-Akrad on January 12 after
successfully surrounding the town from three sides over the preceding weeks.
Salma occupied a dominant high ground and served as the anchor for the
opposition frontline in northern Latakia Province. The regime and its allies
exploited the collapse of the front in order to secure rapid advances deep into
opposition-held terrain. Pro-regime forces later successfully encircled and seized the town of
Rabi’ah on January 24, securing the primary command-and-control node for the
opposition in Jabal al-Turkman. These gains threaten to expel all overt
opposition presence from Latakia Province over the next few months. The regime
and its allies likely intend to ultimately seize the opposition-held city of
Jisr al-Shughour in western Idlib Province in order to anchor their advance and
secure a buffer against future counterattacks.
Strategic Effects
The direct threat posed by Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad to core opposition terrain in Aleppo City and other
parts of Northern Syria will present a critical challenge for U.S. strategic interests.
The realities on the ground currently being set by the regime will entrench the
position of President Assad and his foreign backers, preserving Syria as a
regional base of operations for both Iran and Russia. The renewed pressure
being placed upon the opposition also risks driving opposition groups to deepen
their coordination with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and
other Salafi-jihadist factions. Major opposition factions in the Jaysh al-Fatah
Operations Room based in Idlib Province reportedly came close to signing
a unification agreement supported by Jabhat al-Nusra emir Abu Muhammed
al-Joulani. The incentives to solidify this cooperation will only grow in the
face of further regime gains. The current violence thus stands to solidify
Syria as an arena for U.S. adversaries over the coming months.
The willingness of parties on both
sides to pursue further conflict will only serve to prolong the bloodshed of
the Syrian Civil War and exacerbate the humanitarian consequences of the
conflict. UN officials reported that nearly
40,000 civilians fled the southern countryside of Aleppo City amidst regime
operations in October 2015, while at least 70,000
civilians have fled the latest round of violence in northern Aleppo
Province. The regime has also conducted
a series of engagements in in Central and Southern Syria meant to increase the
pressure brought to bear upon remaining opposition pockets, particularly
through the use of sieges and starvation as weapons of war. The flows of
displaced persons generated by this campaign will place additional strain upon
regional U.S. allies while fueling further resentment and radicalization among
the refugee population.
The looming siege of Aleppo City poses
a strategic dilemma for Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan provided
weapons, supplies, and safe haven to opposition forces in order to advance Turkey’s
strategic objectives, including the formation of a Sunni Islamist government to
replace Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The mounting opposition losses in
Aleppo Province directly undermine these core strategic interests and bring
Russian military personnel to vital positions within forty miles of the
Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey will likely respond to these inflections through
military force. President Erdogan may even consider a range of high-risk
military options to reassert his control over the conflict that could include providing
the opposition with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) or mounting a
cross-border intervention into Northern Syria. These operations risk fueling an
intensified regional proxy war or even a direct confrontation between Turkey
and Russia. The current campaign undertaken by President Assad and his allies
in Moscow and Tehran will be a driver of long-term disorder in Syria and the wider
Middle East.